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Summary: In this article, we evaluate the online local budget transparency (OLBT) for all Slovenian municipalities and analyse 
the impact of various factors on the measured transparency. Most of the municipalities comply with existing regulations. The 
comparison of the mean values of 91 different characteristics shows that municipalities which do not comply with regulation 
are smaller, with poorer education structure and social position of citizens. Several municipalities are providing budget 
transparency beyond the legal requirements. They are smaller and less wealthy than other municipalities complying with 
regulation. We explain both phenomena by agency and legitimacy theory.1
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The transparency of spending public money 
has become of interest in terms of extensive 
research, since it verifies the effects of various 
factors on transparency and vice versa. Greater 
budget transparency is supposed to enable 
more efficient use of public money and the 
implementation of public policies. The main 
purpose of transparency is that the public is 
given access to information related to public 
finances; thus having a greater opportunity to 
influence decisions on public spending and 
public revenues. Caamano-Alegre et al. (2013) 
explained budget transparency as '…a tool 
for facilitating a relationship between public 
budgeting and market requirements, civil society 
demands and citizen participation.' 
In literature, we can find different 
approaches to measuring budget transparency. 
some of the approaches use questionnaires; 
others use tracking the information available 
to the public. The International Budget 
Partnership (i.e. IBP, 2013) uses a complex 
questionnaire to measure the national budget 
transparency index for most countries in the 
world. In our research, we decided to use the 
methodology determined in Ott et al. (2014), 
according to which we checked webpages of 
all the slovenian municipalities to track the 
budget documents available online.
further from research on measuring 
transparency, we can find different studies 
about explanations of transparency and the 
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different impacts of transparency. Explanations 
are usually based on the principal-agent theory 
(ferejohn, 1986; Barro, 1973) and legitimacy 
theory (Weber, 1978 and suchman, 1995). 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) mention also fiscal 
illusion theory. As mentioned, other studies 
focused on the impacts of transparency, 
particularly on fiscal discipline; the efficiency 
of public money allocation; responsibility; 
corruption, etc. (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Hameed, 2005; Wehner and Renzio, 2013). 
Better transparency improves fiscal discipline, 
the efficiency of public money allocation 
and decreases corruption. Despite a range of 
positive effects studied in a variety of research, 
Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) argued also side 
effects of transparency, such as fiscal scandals.
our research adds to different studies in 
at least two points. firstly, we present the 
first measurement of slovenian local budget 
transparency. There is no existing comprehensive 
study of local budget transparency completed 
in slovenia to such an extent. secondly, the 
research complements the existing literature in 
the field of measuring the explanatories on the 
level of transparency of local communities.
The basic research question is how the 
municipalities that demonstrate different 
levels of transparency of budget documents 
differ from each other. or in other words, 
what incentives or external pressures make the 
agents to develop a certain level of possible 
transparency actions. from this point, we 
formulate two specific questions:
What makes the municipalities not 
comply with regulations?
What makes the municipalities develop 
the budget transparency to the highest level 
observed in our research?
To answer the questions, we defined a model 
for comparison of groups of municipalities. 
Therefore, we compared the groups of 
municipalities with different behaviour in 
the provision of transparency and studied 
differences between the pairs of groups. We 
tested 91 fiscal, political, socio-demographic 
and socio-economic indicators. We chose 
them based on previous research, and we 
added others following the explanatory 
theories mentioned before. 
This research complements the findings 
of other authors who used similar indicators 
and analysed their impact on transparency. 
Beside that, it opens also some new questions 
about determinants of the behaviour of the 
municipalities in provision of transparency.
The article is structured as follows: the 
literature review chapter is followed by the 
presentation of methodology and the results 
of the research, along with the comparison of 
findings from similar research. The conclusion 
includes a summary of the findings and 
challenges for future research.
MEASUREMENTS AND DETERMINANTS 
OF BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
Transparency is a very broad concept. It is usually 
connected to availability of information. Esteves 
de Araujo and Tejedo-Romero (2016) defined 
availability of information as supply-side 
transparency, in contrary to demand-side of 
transparency, which is determined as usability 
of this information by different stakeholders. 
Heald (2006) pointed out that transparency is 
a facilitator of good governance. Information 
available to the public should be timely, reliable, 
understandable and comprehensive (Kopits 
and craig, 1998). oEcD (2001, p. 7) adds 
further that budget transparency means 'the 
full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information 
in a timely and systematic manner'. The Inter-
national Monetary fund (IMf) in its Manual 
on fiscal transparency (2007) determined 
that fiscal transparency include fiscal poli-
cy intentions, public sector accounts and 
fiscal projections. Jordan et al. (2017) pointed 
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out also the importance of understandable 
reports, since annual financial reports can 
be too comprehensive to be understood by 
the general public. Esteller-More and Polo-
Otero (2012, p. 1156) summarised different 
definitions into 'fiscal transparency entails a 
government providing detailed information not 
only about its current budgetary activity, but 
also about its future forecasts and past perfor-
mance … and that this information should be 
readily available (e.g. accessible free-of-charge 
on the internet)'. The use of information and 
communication technologies (IcTs) as a tool, 
which can improve fiscal transparency was also 
recognized by different authors (Heeks, 2005; 
Kraemer and King, 2006; Alcaide-Muñoz and 
Rodríguez-Bolívar, 2015). 
Monitoring of budget transparency at 
the national level is carried out by several 
institutions, namely the oEcD Working 
Group, the Eu, and the aforementioned IBP. 
According to the availability of information 
on the openness of national budgets, several 
studies on national budget transparency were 
carried out [e.g. (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Alesina et al., 1999; Bastida and Benito, 2007; 
Wehner and Renzio, 2013)]. since there is no 
common definition of budget transparency, 
there is also no uniform measurement 
methodology. Nevertheless, there are several 
recommendations and measurements, some 
of which have already been mentioned above. 
The oEcD (2002) presents good practices 
of budget transparency, the International 
Monetary fund (IMf, 2014) introduced the 
fiscal transparency code, and the IBP measures 
open budgets by means of a questionnaire 
(IBP, 2013). All these recommendations can 
provide a good basis for the preparation of the 
basic elements for measuring the openness of 
fiscal or budget transparency. This has resulted 
in a number of different measurements and 
questionnaires, leading to a calculation of 
budget transparency index (Tekeng and sharaf, 
2015; Bolívar, Pérez and López-Hernández, 
2013; Jarmuzek et al., 2009; Bastida and 
Benito, 2007).
studies on measuring local budget 
transparency are less frequent. Kroth (Kroth, 
2012) also points out that there is no 
uniform methodology for measuring local 
fiscal transparency since it is more difficult 
to determine, mainly because it requires 
the incorporation of knowledge of local 
conditions. Guillamón et al. (2011) also 
stressed that measurement at sub-national 
level is more complex. In 2012, the IBP 
carried out an analysis of ten pilot studies 
in the field of local budgets. This article also 
states that there are very few studies in the 
field of local government. Nevertheless, in 
the last decade, some research in the field 
of establishing local budget transparency 
can be found in the literature. Beales and 
Thompson (2010) carried out research for 
134 local units in Virginia, usA. They 
checked the availability of information on 
the internet using 16 criteria. other authors 
(Boubeta, santias and Alegre 2010; caamano 
– Allegre et al., 2011, caamano – Allegre et 
al., 2013) examined budget transparency for 
municipalities in an autonomous community 
of spain, Galicia. Rodríguez-Bolívar et al. 
(2013) examined transparency of spanish 
municipalities. They used the methodology of 
the International Monetary fund. using the 
IBP’s methodology, Kroth (2012) carried out an 
analysis for several south American countries, 
as well as for India, Malaysia, Mongolia and 
Mali. Lawson and Alvarez (2013) used the 
IBP’s methodology to evaluate local budget 
transparency in Bali, Indonesia and Tanzania. 
Ma and Wu (2011) used different sources to 
determine fiscal transparency of 31 provinces 
in china. In ott, et al. (2014), the authors 
checked the availability of budget documents 
on websites of local communities in croatia. 
Like the croatian study, the evaluation of local 
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budget transparency was done by reviewing 
websites. Examples of similar methodlogy 
include selected regions in czech Republic 
(sedmihradská, 2015), Romania (Pintea et al., 
2013; Pintea, 2014) and selected American 
cities (styles & Tennyson, 2007). In our 
research, we used the same methodology as 
ott et al. (2014). We review the webpages of 
all slovenian municipalities and checked the 
availability of the selected budget documents. 
The methodology is further explained in the 
chapter about methodology.
Various researchers examined the influence 
of different factors on budget transparency. 
According to different research, the most 
common theories behind 
•	determiners of transparency are agency or 
principal-agent theory, 
•	neo-institutional theory, 
•	legitimacy theory and 
•	fiscal illusion theory. 
The main principle of agency theory is 
that public managers do not have the same 
interests as citizens, and, therefore, disclosure 
of information makes their decisions more 
accountable (Alt et al., 2001; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; fama, 1980; ferejohn, 
1986; Barro, 1973). Elected officials as agents 
should act in the interest of the public that 
elected them. since citizens are not sure about 
the actions of elected officials, asymmetry 
of information occurs. Better transparency 
improves the lack of information, and, 
therefore, stakeholders can inform themselves 
of the actions done by public managers. 
It increases efficiency and confidence and 
therefore reduces the principal-agent problem. 
Rodríguez-Bolívar et al. (2013) along with 
agency theory mentioned neo-institutional 
theory, which explain adaptation of innovations 
in management accounting. According to the 
neo-institutional theory external stakeholders 
influence the organizations to practices 
legitimate and socially acceptable measures 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977, scott, 1987; Powel 
and DiMaggio, 1991). According to legitimacy 
theory, public officials want to disclose 
information about their work to promote 
organizational legitimacy and improve trust 
in public actions. Therefore, transparency 
improves public perception of political 
decisions and makes them more legitimate 
(Heald, 2006; De fine Licht et al., 2011). In 
alignment with principal-agent theory, fiscal 
illusion theory also points out that elected 
officials are not encouraged to be transparent. 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) explained that fiscal 
illusion theory is based on the perception 
that the citizen (taxpayer) is not capable to 
evaluate the full cost of public programmes. In 
addition, they presented the sources of fiscal 
illusion in other empirical research (i.e. oates, 
1991; Heyndels and smolders, 1994). fiscal 
transparency overcomes the problem of fiscal 
illusion since citizens have more information 
available, and, therefore, the illusion on 
underestimated costs and overestimated 
benefits of public spending is decreased.
According to the mentioned theories, 
different research covers the evaluation of the 
impact of political factors (i.e. incumbent’s 
ideology, effective number of political 
parties, coalition governments and political 
participation), economic factors (i.e. GDP 
per capita, local debt, expenditure), and 
socio-cultural factors, i.e. population size and 
unemployment rate (Albalate del sol, 2013). 
Therefore, it is difficult to make a direct 
comparison between research results based on 
reviewed research. Notwithstanding the above, 
some impacts, which have most commonly 
proven to be important, can be drawn from 
most of the research. The results of the research 
show that the number of inhabitants has a 
positive impact on budget transparency (e.g. 
styles and Tennyson, 2007; caamano-Allegre 
et al., 2011). A higher level of development or 
income per capita also has a positive impact 
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(Giroux and McLelland, 2003). Most of the 
research did not find any significant impact 
of local debt (sedmihradska and Haas, 
2013; caamano-Allegre et al., 2013;2 Gerunov, 
2016). 
our research differs from other studies in 
that it includes the analysis of the behaviour of 
municipalities, grouping them into categories 
of those that achieved the index that fulfils the 
legal requirements and those that do not fulfil 
these requirements and evaluates the impact 
of the factors mentioned. This study includes 
the indicators that can be divided into three 
main categories: economic, demographic and 
societal. The average values of these indicators 
are compared according to the index achieved.
METHODOLOGY
This article presents the results of the first 
evaluation of the local budget transparency 
index in slovenia. We used the methodology 
implemented by ott et al. (2014). As explained 
above, the review of websites was also used 
to determine the transparency in several 
other studies (Kadunc, 2016; sedmihradská, 
2015; Pintea et al., 2013; styles & Tenny-
son, 2007). The difference from IMf, oEcD 
and IBP measurements is that we checked the 
availability of the document as they are, since 
mentioned measurements use surveys among 
experts on several questions connected to the 
fiscal transparency (ie. clear strategy of fiscal 
development) and not only budget itself. In 
most cases the mentioned toolkits are prepared 
for central governments and some parts do 
no apply for local budget transparency. We 
decided to measure transparency as availability 
of selected budget documents for general 
public. The main purpose of determining the 
index is to check which documents related to 
the municipality’s budget are published on 
their websites. The index is thus determined 
by reviewing the municipalities’ websites and 
determining whether the documents related 
to budgets are available to the public. In 
this study, the publication of the following 
documents was examined (Table 1).
According to the regulations, the publication 
of the following documents is required: budget 
proposal, enacted budget and end-year report 
of the budget (Public finance Act – Jf uPB4, 
official Gazette of the Republic of slovenia, 
no. 14/13 of 15 february 2013), which means 
that municipalities that publish at least the 
oLBT 1, 2 and 4 (Table 1) documents comply 
with the regulations. All aspects of transparency 
include two additional documents, a mid-year 
report on the implementation of the budget 
and the citizens’ budget (oLBT 3 and 5) 
(Table 1).
We checked the municipalities’ websites 
in accordance with the terms set out in the 
legislation. In order to determine the index 
for 2015/2016, we examined the period from 
December to April, and verified whether the 
mid-year report for 2015, budget proposal for 
2016, enacted budget for 2016 and the final 
accounts of the budget proposal for 2015 were 
published. At the same time, we checked that 
the so-called citizens’ budget is present on 
the webpage. The presence of each of these 
documents adds one point to the final index. 
If all the stated documents are published on 
the municipality’s website, the municipality 
achieves an index of 5. By calculating the 
transparency index, local communities were 
classified according to the relationship in 
regards to the provision of transparency. 
The second step of the research was 
aimed at finding the differences between 
local communities with different levels of 
transparency provision. To determine whether 
the behaviour of municipalities regarding the 
information transparency is mainly affected 
by institutional factors or whether the 
environmental impact is of greater significance 
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we considered the classification into two 
main groups of factor variables as follows: 
institutional factors and environmental factors 
(Muñoz & Bolívar, 2015).
Along with this approach, we considered 
another similar classification focused on 
information transparency drivers, which 
takes into account four perspectives (Ma & 
Wu, 2011): the perspective external demand 
on the site of the environmental impact and 
three perspectives expressing the institutional 
factors (fiscal performance, resources and 
capacity and strategic leadership). 
finally, to preserve compatibility with the 
majority of other studies which consider a bit 
more macro-economic view, we considered 
four classes of variables (sol, 2013): fiscal, 
institutional and political, socio demographic 
and economic context variables and furnished 
our data model with the sociodemographic 
class. The structure of the data model is 
presented in the Table 2.
following the above-mentioned theories 
and previous research on influence of different 
factors on behaviour of municipalities’ 
officials, we defined a data model with 91 
variables (Table 5 in appendix) with 3 control 
variables, 15 fiscal condition variables, 10 
variables of political competition, 4 variables 
defining municipal size, 34 mucipal wealth 
varaibles, 18 social capital variables and 7 
variables of environmental capital. We took 
the core variables from the previous research 
and supplemented them with additional 
variables from available sources. The core 
varaibles included
Table 1
Online lOcal budget transparency  
(Olbt)
1 Budget proposal Any document which in its title includes a budget proposal or a draft on a 
municipality’s website, regardless of whether it is published separately or as part 
of the documentation for consideration at a meeting.
2 Enacted budget Decree on the enacted budget, the enacted budget only as a document or the 
enacted budget published in a local official journal or local newspaper. The 
condition is that the document is published on the municipality’s website (i.e. 
as part of an official journal or newspaper). If the budget was not adopted in 
time, the decree on temporary financing is also considered. If the enacted budget 
is published as a link to another website which, for example, publishes public 
information of municipalities, it is considered that the document is not available 
on the municipality’s website.
3 Mid-year report on the 
implementation of the budget
It is considered that the document is published if it is published separately or as 
part of the documentation of the municipal council meeting, and it is clear from 
the title of the document that it is a mid-year report. 
4 Year-end report on the 
implementation of the budget
It is considered that the document is published if it is published separately or as 
a part of documentation of the municipal council meeting, and it is clear from the 
title of the document that it is a year-end report. 
5 Citizens’ budget It shall be considered if the municipality’s website includes any simplified 
explanation of the budget, its meaning, or general explanation.
Source: own edited
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•	investment, debt, electoral turnout, mayor’s 
gender, population size, unemployment 
(Esteves de Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 
2016); 
•	municipal budget balance, municipal 
public expenditure, municipal public 
debt, effective number of political parties, 
number of inhabitants, unemployment 
rate (caamaño-Alegre, Lago-Peñas, Reyes-
santias, & santiago-Boubeta, 2013); 
•	transfers/total revenues, current transfers/
total revenues, capital transfers/total 
revenues, public deficit, voter abstention, 
population, percentage of population over 
65 years (Esteller-Moré & otero, 2012); 
•	debt, budget_imbalance, budget surplus, 
turnout, gender, population, economic 
activity, unemployment, tourism, elderly 
(sol, 2013); 
•	municipal debt per capita, municipal 
deficit per capita, tax revenue per capita, 
regional and central transfers per capita, 
municipal political strength, Rate of female 
aldermen in the council, mayor gender, 
population of the municipality, income 
per capita, number of entities depending 
on the municipality, turn out rate in last 
municipal elections (Guillamón, Bastida, 
& Benito, 2011).
The lack of homogeneity of slovenian 
municipalities was at that point a considerable 
challenge that required the development 
of an appropriate research approach. 
Apparently, we considered the fact that 
slovenian municipalities include 11 urban 
municipalities, which differ significantly from 
the others by size and development. Therefore, 
the method described was used across the set of 
slovenian municipalities excluding the urban 
municipalities, whereas a short, qualitative 
analysis was carried out as a glance at the issues 
in the set of urban municipalities.
following the theories (agency, institutional 
and legitimacy), we put the attention on 
the differences between the groups of local 
communities exhibiting different behaviour. 
Table 2
structure Of the data mOdel
data model
factors  
(muñoz & bolívar, 2015)
perspectives  
(ma & Wu, 2011)
groups of variables  
(sol, 2013)
institutional institutional
Financial condition Financial condition Fiscal performance Fiscal variables
Inter-government transfers Institutional and political 
variablesPolitical competition Political competition Strategic leadership
Environmental Environmental
Size of municipality Size of municipality
Municipal wealth Development External demand Economic context
Income levels Resources and capacity
Social capital Socio-demographic
Environmental capital
Source: own edited
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Accordingly, we divided municipalities in 
two ways: based on their compliance with 
the regulations and regarding their fulfilment 
of all observed aspects of transparency. 
The assumption was that by exploring the 
differences between the groups, the reasons 
for certain (undesirable and desirable) types of 
behaviour could be detected. 
In order to examine the differences between 
the groups, we used a t-test for independent 
samples. Due to the large size of the examined 
dataset (201 municipalities), we could 
assume the usage of t-test as appropriate. 
The interpretation of the results of t-test 
(difference between means) compared to the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test (sum of 
ranks) is also more informative. for nominal 
indicator variables, such as the gender of the 
mayor, we used a z-test for the comparison 
of proportions. We defined statistically 
significant differences between the groups at 
the significance level α=0.1. 
RESEARCH RESULTS
The evaluation of budget transparency 
showed that the average index is relatively 
low, since it reached an average value of 3.4. 
This is partly due to the delays in the process 
of adopting final accounts of local budgets 
and the fact that many municipalities report 
about the mid-year budget realisation in the 
form of news which is communicated to the 
municipal council by the mayor; however, 
the documents with this content are not 
available on the Internet. Municipalities 
have the lowest index regarding the 'citizens’ 
budget', since slovenia has not yet adopted 
the oEcD recommendations, i.e. 'a budget 
for the general public', which are supposed 
to promote a simplified explanation of the 
budget. Results by individual municipality are 
shown in Figure 1. It is interesting to note that 
no municipality reached the index 0, which 
means that municipalities publish at least one 
document in connection with the budget on 
their websites.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
second step of the research was the analysis 
of factors influencing different behaviour 
of municipalities in the provision of budget 
transparency. The population was the set of 
slovenian non-urban municipalities (201 of 
212). We analysed two kinds of behaviour 
comparing groups of municipalities regarding 
noncompliance with regulations and regarding 
fulfilling all aspects of transparency.
The results of the former analysis showed 
that 41 municipalities do not comply with 
the regulations on budget transparency and 
160 municipalities publish budget documents 
in accordance with the regulations. on 
the basis of the established criterion, 18 
variables that show differences between both 
groups of municipalities were drawn from 
the full set of variables, in accordance with 
the assumption that the significance of the 
t-test is p ≤ 0,1 (Table 3). Almost all of them 
were the environmental factors, forming 
three categories: the size of the municipality 
(5 variables), social capital (4 variables) and 
municipal wealth (7 variables). The two 
remaining variables expressing a certain level of 
statistical significance of the differences were of 
the political nature, but both were dependent 
on the population of a municipality (number 
of elected officials, number of candidates).
Based on the evidence, we could conclude 
that the compliance with regulations is driven 
by environmental factors which cover the 
socio-demographic and economic context. All 
the differences are in the favour of the group 
of municipalities which are at least compliant 
with regulations. We could therefore derive 
the picture of the characteristics of the 
municipalities not meeting the regulations 
requests. The municipalities that do not 
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ensure budget transparency in accordance 
with the regulations are of smaller size. A 
similar impact of the size and the volume of 
expenditure of municipalities was determined 
in other research (caamano-Alegre et al. 2011; 
serrano-cinca et al. 2008; styles and Tennyson 
2007; Hemeed, 2005). furthermore, these 
municipalities have a worse educational 
structure of employees and inhabitants. A 
similar impact of the educational structure 
of inhabitants was also determined in 
other research (Perez et al., 2008; Gandia 
& Archidona, 2007; serrano-cinca et al., 
2008). finally, their lower municipal wealth is 
expressed by 
•	the number of social assistance recipients 
per 1000 inhabitants and 
•	premature mortality (at the statistical 
significance level p ≤ 0,05) and 
•	the percentage of accused persons, 
•	amount of waste collected, 
•	percentage of inhabitants having less than 
10 m2 of living area, 
•	percentage of inappropriate dwellings and 
•	number of companies per 1000 
inhabitants (at the statistical significance 
level p ≤ 0,11). 
A similar impact of poorer development 
on transparency is indirectly demonstrated 
in the research by Bastida & Benito (2007); 
Laswad et al. (2005); Piotrowski & Van Ryzin 
(2007).
Besides that, a short correlation analysis 
showed that the size of municipalities 
(population) is in correlation with most of 
the above-mentioned variables (percentage 
of employed people with highly-skilled 
professions, premature mortality, percentage of 
Figure 1
the Olbt index
Source: own edited
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accused persons, education index, percentage 
of highly-educated people, amount of waste 
collected in kg per capita, percentage of 
inhabitants having less than 10 m2 of living 
area, and number of companies per 1000 
inhabitants). Additionally, considering the 
three variables not being in correlation with 
the population (social assistance recipients 
per 1,000 inhabitants, age dependency, and 
percentage of people with inappropriate 
dwellings), we could conclude that the 
group of the municipalities not being able to 
provide regulatory stipulated level of budget 
transparency consists of smaller municipalities, 
with a lower level of social capital and economic 
power and a worse socio-economic situation.
Table 3
differences in arithmetic means Of variables betWeen the grOups  
Of municipalities – cOmpliance With the legislatiOn (nO/yes)
variable p diff. classification
Percentage of employed people with highly–skilled 
professions
0.017 –0.02 Environmental Social capital
Age dependency index 0.035 –1.62 Environmental Social capital
Education index 0.062 –4.01 Environmental Social capital
Percentage of highly–educated people 0.069 –0.78 Environmental Social capital
Social assistance recipients (per 1,000 inhabitants) 0.025 0.54 Environmental Municipal wealth
Premature mortality 0.043 1.05 Environmental Municipal wealth
Percentage of accused persons 0.054 0.00 Environmental Municipal wealth
Amount of waste collected in kg per capita 0.070 –25.18 Environmental Municipal wealth
Percentage of inhabitants having less than 10 m2  
of living area
0.077 2.09 Environmental Municipal wealth
Inappropriate dwellings proportion 0.084 6.04 Environmental Municipal wealth
Number of companies per 1000 inhabitants 0.099 –4.42 Environmental Municipal wealth
Expenditures 0.004 –2 762 141.00 Institutional Financial condition
Revenues 0.005 –2 725 336.00 Institutional Financial condition
Employed 0.018 –763.85 Environmental Municipal wealth
Population 0.019 –1 913.23 Environmental Municipality size
Area 0.082 –26.36 Environmental Municipality size
Number of elected 0.055 –1.95 Institutional Political competition
No. Of candidates for municipality council 0.107 –20.78 Institutional Political competition
Source: own edited
 focus – Quality of ratings 
Public finance Quarterly  2019/3 403
The second comparison addressed the 
municipalities which ensure the publication 
of prescribed budget documents, i.e. the 
municipalities with the optimal behaviour 
model, which publish all the documents 
considered, and the municipalities which do 
not publish one or both additional documents 
(Table 1, 3 – Mid-year report on the 
implementation of the budget or 5 – citizens’ 
budget). using the same threshold p ≤ 0,1 
(Table 4) we extracted four institutional and 
eight environmental factors. Two institutional 
factors belonged to the political competition 
category and two others to the category 
of financial condition. The environmental 
factors include a slightly more coloured set of 
categories with four variables for municipal 
wealth, two variables for municipality size, 
and a single variable for two of the other 
categories (environmental capital and social 
capital). Results points out variables similar 
as in other studies, since municipalities giving 
full budget transparency had male mayors, 
mayors not replaced at last elections, a higher 
share of wages and material costs in total 
expenditure and lower expenditures per capita 
(ie. Esteves de Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 
2016; Alesina, Troiano & cassidy, 2015; Lee, 
Moretti & Butler, 2004; ferreira & Gyourko, 
2009 and 2014). Environmental factors had 
lower values of municipal wealth factors 
(gross added value per employee, average net 
wage, local economic investment) except of 
a percentage of habitants with a small living 
area. The municipalities from this group cover 
a smaller area and are more densely populated. 
Besides of that, they have a smaller proportion 
of Natural 2000 areas and worse age structure 
change trend. We expected that the analysis 
of differences between groups would produce 
results along with the theoretical premises as 
it was in the case of the former comparison. 
on the contrary, we revealed that the 
characteristics of municipalities giving full 
budget transparency did not experience 
theoretically-expected incentives.
The established facts apply also to 11 urban 
municipalities, of which 2 do not cover the 
legal requirements for transparency, and 9 
comply with the legislation, i.e. they publish 
an additional mid-year report; 2 of these also 
provide a complete set of budget transparency 
elements. Both phenomena discussed above 
are also expressed in urban municipalities 
in a similar way, as in the set of non-urban 
municipalities. Both municipalities which 
do not ensure the publication of prescribed 
documents are located in the north-east 
of slovenia, and both are characterised by 
difficult economic and social situations. The 
municipalities which publish the complete 
set of documents considered are smaller and 
economically weaker, as is the case in non-
urban municipalities.
CONCLUSION
As mentioned above, we analysed the 
differences for two pairs of groups of 
municipalities for institutional (financial 
condition, intergovernmental subsidies, and 
political competition) and environmental 
factors (municipal size, income level and 
municipal wealth) of fiscal transparency. 
Along with agency and legitimacy theory, we 
expected to find differences in at least some 
variables in each category. However, like several 
other researchers, we were not able to confirm 
all theoretical expectations. Moreover, in the 
case of municipalities providing full budget 
transparency, the results were just opposite as 
expected.
The evidence of the comparison between 
municipalities which did and did not comply 
with regulation revealed that institutional 
factors have no influence on budget 
transparency. so we could conclude that for 
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this case the agency theory is not applicable. 
Notwithstanding, we could employ legitimacy 
theory claiming that the incumbents of bigger 
and more developed municipalities tend to 
fulfil the expectations of the stakeholders. 
furthermore, the municipalities not satisfying 
regulations probably have too few resources or 
are, because of other challenges, less focused 
on fiscal information disclosure. 
The comparison between the municipalities 
giving full budget transparency and other 
municipalities satisfying regulations brought 
just the opposite results (Table 4). Both 
institutional and environmental variables 
had (excepting percentage of habitants with 
small living area), opposite values than 
expected. In our literature research, we did 
not found evidence like that; however, the 
phenomenon could be somehow explained 
by agency and legitimacy theory. Namely, we 
asked the question, 'what are the factors that 
made the municipality to disclose budget 
information voluntarily?' This meant that 
agents in less wealthy municipalities put 
additional effort to make the information 
more visible to the principal. Transparency 
Table 4
differences in arithmetic means Of variables betWeen the grOups  
Of municipalities – all dOcuments published (nO/yes)
variable p diff. classification
Unemployment change 0.108 0.846 Environmental Municipal wealth
Proportion of natura 2000 area 0.005 15.740 Environmental Environmental capital
Age structure change 0.017 –0.028 Environmental Social capital
Gross added value per employee 0.002 4009.000 Environmental Municipal wealth
Average net wage 0.037 36.650 Environmental Municipal wealth
Local economy investment 0.063 455.070 Environmental Municipal wealth
Average gross wage 0.069 57.150 Environmental Municipal wealth
Percentage of inhabitants having less than 10m2  
of living area
0.069 1.760 Environmental Municipal wealth
Density 0.008 –49.920 Environmental Municipality size
Area 0.046 41.320 Environmental Municipality size
Share of wages and material costs in total 
expenditure
0.055 –1.590 Institutional Financial condition
Net current expenditures per capita 0.109 36.180 Institutional Financial condition
Mayor gender 0.000 0.094 Institutional Political competition
Replacement of the mayor 0.032 0.190 Institutional Political competition
Source: own edited
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increases the degree of confidence and 
public trust in political actors (Laswad 
et al., 2005). Also, an increased level of 
transparency in government decision-making 
and activities reinforces the likelihood of 
democracy and citizen involvement (Esteves 
de Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016), which 
probably could leverage the development of 
municipalities. Additionally, as information 
disclosure is a way to legitimate actions to 
their stakeholders (Archel et al., 2009) the 
incumbents of less successful municipalities 
tend to gain the confidence of citizens, regain 
the confidence of citizens and change their 
perceptions of the organizations.
since these municipalities provide the 
citizens with comprehensive information, this 
phenomenon could also be named 'focus on 
citizens', which is additional aspect, which is 
not researched in that case. 
Appendix
Table 5
all 91 variables used in the analysis With their units Of measure  
and sOurce Where they Were Obtained 
variable units of measure class source
Old municipality Dummy variable: 1 – established in 1991, 0 
– established after 1991
CV SORS
Cohesion region Cohesion region: 1 – east slovenia, 2 – west 
slovenia
CV SORS
Statistical region One of 12 statistical regions in slovenia CV SORS
Revenues 2015 EUR FC MF
Expenditures 2015 EUR FC MF
Deficit/suficit 2015 EUR FC MF
The share of wages and material costs in total 
expenditure
Percentage FC MF
The share of government assistance in the budgets 
of cities
Percentage FC MF
Budget and efficiency index – aggregated indicator 
from variables with annotation
Index FC GS
Eu funds obtained EUR FC GS
Growth of non-transferable and durable revenues Percentage FC GS
Indebtedness EUR FC GS
Debt growth EUR FC GS
Net current expenditure (eff) EUR FC GS
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variable units of measure class source
Increase of expenditure for public administration 
(eff)
Percentage FC GS
Investments (eff) EUR FC GS
Financial autonomy of municipalities Index FC GS
Self-sufficiency index – aggregated indicator from 
variables with annotation
Index FC GS
Environment index – aggregated indicator from 
variables with annotation
Index EC GS
Replacement of the mayor at last elections Dummy variable: 1 – new mayor, 0 – old 
mayor
PC SEC
Number of candidates for municipality council Number PC SEC
Number of elected Number PC SEC
Proportion of elected candidates Percentage PC SEC
Number of political parties with representation in 
local legislative body
Number PC SEC
Mayor gender Binary variable: 1 – male, 2 – female PC SEC
Political party of mayor Binary variable: 0 – local party, 1 – national 
party
PC SEC
Mandate Number PC SEC
% of voters for elected mayor Percentage PC SEC
Mayor wage EUR PC MF
Area Km2 MS SORS
Population Number MS SORS
Density People per km2 MS SORS
Number of settlements Number MS SORS
Average income per capita EUR MW SORS
Employed Number MW SORS
Unemployment rate Percentage MW SORS
Average gross wage EUR MW SORS
Net migration between municipalities Index MW SORS
Net migration Per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Economy index – aggregated indicator from 
variables with annotation
Index MW GS
Promotion of a small economy EUR MW GS
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variable units of measure class source
Added value EUR per inhabitant MW GS
Gross investment in the economy EUR per inhabitant MW GS
Number of companies Number per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Change in the number of companies Number per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
New businesses Number per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Revenue growth Percentage MW GS
Labour market index – aggregated indicator from 
variables with annotation
Index MW GS
Funds for an active employment policy per capita 
(lm)
EUR per inhabitant MW GS
The share of persons in employment Percentage MW GS
Number of jobs in the municipality Per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Job structure – percentage of highly qualified jobs Percentage MW GS
Change in the number of posts Percentage MW GS
Movement of unemployment Percentage MW GS
Living standard index – aggregated indicator from 
variables with annotation
Index MW GS
Budget expenditure on culture EUR per inhabitant MW GS
Budgetary expenditure on sport EUR per inhabitant MW GS
Net wages EUR MW GS
Average gross receipts EUR MW GS
The share of the population living on less than 10 m2 
of residential area
Per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Recipients of social assistance Per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Share of inhabited dwellings that do not have all the 
elements of basic infrastructure 
Per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Premature mortality Per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Change in average gross earnings Percentage MW GS
New connections to the sewage system Per 1000 inhabitants MW GS
Social cohesion and political culture index – 
aggregated indicator from variables with annotation
Index MW GS
Budgetary expenditure on international cooperation EUR per inhabitant MW GS
Percentage of highly educated people Percentage SC SORS
Percentage of people older than 65 Percentage SC SORS
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variable units of measure class source
Percentage of accused persons Percentage SC SORS
Voters turnout in the last local elections Percentage SC SEC
Demography index Index SC GS
Aging index – aggregated indicator from variables 
with annotation
Index SC GS
Age dependency coefficient Ratio SC GS
Change in the number of inhabitants Percentage SC GS
Change in age structure Percentage SC GS
Education index – aggregated indicator from 
variables with annotation
Index SC GS
Municipal grants EUR per 1000 inhabitants SC GS
Educational structure – percentage of highly 
educated people
Percentage SC GS
Share of graduates Per 1000 inhabitants SC GS
Share of new doctors and masters of science Per 1000 inhabitants SC GS
Change in educational structure Percentage points SC GS
Turnout Percentage SC GS
Convicted criminals Per 1000 inhabitants SC GS
The share of long-term unemployed population Percentage SC GS
Environmental protection expenditure EUR per inhabitant EC GS
Expenditure on the promotion of efficient energy use EUR per inhabitant EC GS
Waste Kg per inhabitant EC GS
Natura 2000 Percentage EC GS
Increase in the amount of waste Percentage EC GS
Final index Index EC GS
Remarks: Class: CV – Control Variable, FC – Financial Condition, PC – Political competition, MS – Municipal Size, MW – Municipal 
Wealth, SC – Social Capital, EC – Environmental Capital; Sources: 
Source: SORS – Statistical Office of Republic of Slovenia, MF – Ministry of Finance, SEC – State Election Commission, GS – Golden 
Stone
Notes
1 This work has been supported by croatian science foundation under the project (IP-2014-09-3008) and 
by slovenian Research Agency under the project (ID P5-0093).
2 They found a positive impact of debt on their first partial transaprency index.
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